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ERRORS I N T H E COMMISSION'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While most of the factual statements contained in the Commission's Brief are 
accurate, the Commission made several significant misstatements that contradict its own 
Findings as set forth in the appealed Final Decision. In order to ensure an accurate record 
for this appeal, Unocal identifies the misstatements and provides clarifying explanations with 
appropriate supporting citations to the record in the first Addendum to this Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. T H E COMMISSION'S CLAIM THAT T H E SEVERANCE TAX 
STATUTES REQUIRE VALUATION OF OIL A N D GAS AT T H E POINT 
OF EVENTUAL SALE WAS RESOLVED BY EXXONMOBIL A N D IS 
N O T A N ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Unocal filed its Petition for Review of the Tax Commission's Final Decision by which 
it raised issues regarding the prospective application of ExxonMobil, the proper interpretation 
of the Court's language giving prospective effect to the ExxonMobil decision, and the 
interpretation of severance tax statutory provisions which were not at issue in ExxonMobil 
Because the Division did not file a cross-petition, the only issues which are properly 
before this Court are those issues which have been identified by the Petitioner, Unocal. 
Dairylandlns, Co, v. State FarmMut Auto, Ins, Co,, 882 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Utah 1994) (Court 
declined to consider issue for which cross-appeal was not filed); In re Estate of Lewis, 738 P.2d 
617, 623 (Utah 1987); Bentlej v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 622 (Utah 1984). Nevertheless, the 
Commission devotes a significant portion of its brief to its argument that the severance tax 
statutes require valuation of oil and gas after processing has occurred.1 
1
 The issue raised by the Commission in Section I of its Brief is exacdy the same issue 
the Commission raised in the ExxonMobil appeal. This is evidenced by the fact that 
1 
As the Commission concedes in its own brief, a party may not seek to relitigate an 
issue which it has already been fully and fairly litigated, resulting in a final judgment on the 
merits.2 The ExxonMobil Court "reverse [d] the Tax Commission's determination that 
severance taxes should be based on the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale" and 
held that "[valuation must occur in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the oil and gas 
remaining in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, f^ 24. Because the issue of whether the 
severance tax statutes require valuation of oil and gas at the point of sale is not properly 
before this Court, Unocal does not deem it appropriate to reply to the Commission's 
arguments regarding alleged error in the ExxonMobilCourt's interpretation of severance tax 
laws. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER T H E PROSPECTIVE RELIEF 
LIMITATION OF EXXONMOBIL. 
In its Opening Brief, Unocal explained that this Court has the right to revisit a prior 
decision when the issue "did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues 
actually litigated in the lower courts" and subsequent events demonstrate that "the decision is 
clearly erroneous." Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ^  20 and 21. Unocal explained that 
approximately 40% of the Commission's argument in the first section of the argument 
portion of its brief is lifted verbatim from the brief filed by the Commission in the 
ExxonMobil appeal. See Brief of Respondent/Appellee, Auditing Division of the Utah State 
Tax Commission ("ExxonMobil'Brief'), filed May 12, 2003, portions of which are attached 
hereto, compare Respondent's Brief, pp. 15-16 to ExxonMobil Brief, p. 10; Respondent's Brief, 
pp. 19-20 to ExxonMobil Brief, pp. 18-19; Respondent's Brief, pp. 20-21 to ExxonMobil Brief, 
pp. 23-24; and Respondent's Brief, pp. 21-22 to ExxonMobil Brief, pp. 24-25, See Addendum, 
pp. 0005-0011. 
2
 See Commission's Brief, pp. 39-43, citing Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, 
\ 34, 73 P.3d 325, 332. 
2 
the concerns articulated by the ExxonMobil Court as the basis for the prospective relief 
limitation were unfounded because (1) revitalization funds are only impacted when wells are 
located on Indian lands; (2) there were no "other relatively small governmental entities" 
which would have been impacted by the retroactive application of ExxonMobil, and 
(3) revenue concerns articulated by the Court are not implicated by deficiency proceedings. 
Unocal also explained that a court's interpretation of a statute should not be limited to 
prospective application because the Court's interpretation "is deemed to state the true nature 
of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 675 (Utah 
1984). 
The Commission has not rebutted Unocal's claims that the ExxonMobil decision was 
based on a misapprehension of facts, but simply claims that the failure of the "potentially 
devastating effects" to materialize "affirms rather than challenges the wisdom of the Court's 
decision," Commission's Brief, p. 39, and that claim preclusion and issue preclusion bar 
Unocal from asking the Court to reconsider the prospective relief limitation. The 
Commission also suggests that taxpayers who relied on the prospective relief limitation and 
did not appeal their assessments would be unfairly prejudiced if the relief requested by 
Unocal was granted. None of these arguments effectively rebut the application otMunson to 
this matter. The Commission likewise fails to respond to Unocal's claim that the prospective 
relief limitation is improper in matters of statutory interpretation. As Unocal explained in its 
Opening Brief, the ExxonMobilCourt's decision to limit the application of its decision was 
unprecedented and creates dangerous precedent. 
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A. The Concerns Articulated By The ExxonMobil Coutt Did Not 
Materialize Because They Were Unfounded. 
Notwithstanding the Commission's claim to the contrary, the continued solvency of 
the Revitalization Funds is not the result of the ExxonMobil Court's decision because, as 
Unocal explained in its Opening Brief, the solvency of the Revitalization Funds and "other 
relatively small governmental entities" was never threatened by the pending refund requests 
and deficiency proceedings. 
First, even though ExxonMobil was granted limited retroactive relief and the 
Commission ultimately ordered a severance tax refund, that refund was paid out of the state's 
General Fund. Unocal's Opening Brief, p. 22, n. 4. Thus, even in the one case where the 
Court concluded retroactive application was appropriate, there was no impact whatsoever on 
the Revitalization Funds. This suggests that other refund actions, had they been allowed to 
proceed, would likewise have had no impact on the Revitalization Funds. 
Second, "other relatively small governmental entities" for which the ExxonMobil 
Court expressed concern were never threatened by refund requests because all severance 
taxes, except for the portion reserved for Revitalization Funds when wells are located on 
Indian lands, are remitted to the state's General Fund. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-115. The 
Commission has not rebutted this fact. 
Third, application of ExxonMobil'to deficiency assessments posed no threat to the 
Revitalization Funds because deficiency assessment do not involve taxes already collected 
and spent. Yet by prohibiting the retroactive application of its interpretation of severance tax 
law, the Court has effectively allowed the Commission to continue to enforce its erroneous 
interpretation of severance tax laws. Thus, even where taxpayers like Unocal have paid their 
4 
severance taxes based on the correct interpretation of the statute, those taxpayers are forced 
to pay additional severance taxes based on the method rejected by this Court in ExxonMobil. 
Finally, because the Revitalization Funds only receive severance taxes when the 
taxpayer operates wells on Indian lands, those Funds will never be impacted by the 
retroactive application o£ ExxonMobil to refund requests by operators of wells not located on 
Indian lands. Unocal's wells are not located on Indian lands and yet Unocal has been 
precluded from relying on the correct interpretation of severance tax laws because the 
ExxonMobil Court feared the potential impact on Revitalization Funds.3 The Commission 
has not rebutted this crucial fact and offers no theory upon which this Court could sustain its 
prospective relief limitation in light of this significant oversight. 
Even the ExxonMobil'Court admitted that "the full breadth and depth of the impact 
[was] not immediately apparent from the record." ExxonMobil, f^ 23. It is clear now, in view 
of the facts in Unocal's Petition, that the concerns articulated by the ExxonMobil Coutt were 
unique to the matter before it and did not justify giving only prospective effect to the 
decision. The Commission's suggestion that non-occurrence of the "potentially devastating 
effects" is the direct result of the Court's prospective effect limitation, is baseless in light of 
the uncontroverted facts. This is precisely the kind of error this Court has the right to 
correct under Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ^ f 20 ("Although we are normally bound by 
our own precedent, we may overrule it where 'the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions 
have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable.'"). 
3
 Although ExxonMobil had wells on Indian lands, there was no evidence presented 
to the ExxonMobil'Court that other taxpayers with pending refund requests had wells on 
Indian lands. 
5 
B. Neither Issue Preclusion Nor Claim Preclusion Have Application In 
This Matter. 
The Commission also claims that Unocal is barred from requesting reconsideration of 
this issue by the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion applies 
when the same party (or their privies) attempt to relitigate a claim which was fully litigated in 
a previous action. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13 f 34, 73 P.3d 325. Issue 
preclusion arises from a different cause of action and applies when (1) the party raising the 
issue was "a party or in privity with a party to the prior action"; (2) the issue decided was 
identical to the issue raised in the instant action; (3) the issue in the first action was 
"completely, fairly, and fully litigated"; and (4) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits. Id. f^ 35. Neither doctrine has any application to the circumstances pertaining to 
the prospective relief issue because (1) Unocal was not in privity with or a party to the 
ExxonMobil litigation, and (2) the issue of whether prospective relief should apply was not 
fully and fairly Etigated. 
1. Unocal was not in privity with ExxonMobil. 
Unlike the Commission, Unocal was not a party to the ExxonMobil appeal. This 
Court has held that, '"when the party sought to be precluded was not an actual party in the 
first lawsuit,"' "[d]ue process concerns are present.'" Brigham Young University v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19 \ 28, 110 P.3d 678, 686, quoting Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 
454 (8th Cir. 1996). In order to ensure that a party is not deprived of its right to a day in 
court, this Court has required that the party for which privity is asserted be '"so identified in 
interest with another that he represents the same legal right.'" Id., [^ 29, quoting Searle Bros. v. 
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). 
6 
ExxonMobil no longer represented "the same legal right" as Unocal. ExxonMobil 
was granted retroactive relief, while Unocal's prospect of relief for the claims which it had 
agreed to suspend pending resolution of ExxonMobil's claim was significantly diminished, if 
not entirely dashed. Because the Court gave retroactive effect to its decision for 
ExxonMobil, ExxonMobil had no interest in the Petition for Rehearing and, in fact, did not 
participate in that Petition.4 For that reason alone, this Court should recognize that Unocal 
was not in privity with ExxonMobil with regard to the prospective relief issue. Unocal's 
limited participation in the prior proceeding does not render Unocal subject to res judicata. 
TRW, Inc. v. Ellipse Corp., 495 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Or. 111. 1974) (limited role of observing 
proceedings and filing amicus briefs "are insufficient modes of participation to render 
applicable the doctrine of res judicata."), citingBrown-Crummer Investment Co. v. Paulter, 70 F.2d 
184 (10th Or. 1934). 
2. The prospective relief issue was not fully and fairly litigated. 
In its Opening Brief, Unocal explained that this Court "did not benefit from the focus 
and refinement afforded issues actually litigated in lower courts" because the prospective 
relief issue was not raised by either party to the appeal, but by the amici Navajo 
4
 Ironically, when Unocal and other similarly situated amici filed the Petition for 
Rehearing, the Commission moved to strike the Petition, claiming that the amicus parties did 
not have the right to request rehearing because "[a]n amicus is not a party to the action and 
cannot assume the functions of a party." Commission's Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Strike, p. 2, Case No. 20021023-SC, filed December 15, 2003, See Addendum, 
p. 0013, see also Commission's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, filed 
Dec. 10, 2003 ("The consent of the parties to participate initially in filing an amicus curiae 
brief does not extend to the amicus the full rights of a party to the litigation."), Addendum, 
p. 0016. Now, the Commission reverses its position claiming that "Unocal established 
privity with ExxonMobil upon participating in the prior action." Commission's Brief, p. 42. 
7 
RevitaKzation Fund and the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund. The Commission erroneously 
claims that Unocal had the opportunity to "fully address" the prospective limitation issue and 
that the Court was "fully informed of the potential for its decision." Commission's Brief, 
p. 40. 
The truth of the matter is that the only time Unocal or any of the other similarly 
situated amicus parties addressed the prospectivity issue was in the Memorandum in Support 
of Petition for Rehearing filed two weeks after the ExxonMobil decision had been issued.5 
The Commission moved to strike the Petition for Rehearing on the grounds that Unocal and 
the other petitioning parties were amicus parties and, therefore, did not have standing to 
request a rehearing. The Court denied the Petition without a hearing and did not provide 
any explanation for its ruling.6 Thus, contrary to the Commission's representations, Unocal 
never had "full opportunity to argue its position." Id. There is no basis for this Court to 
conclude that the issue of the prospective relief limitation has been fully and fairly litigated. 
This Court should not hesitate to revisit the prospectivity issue if it concludes that the 
5
 This issue was not raised until two months after Unocal and the supporting amici 
parties had already filed their amicus briefs. Unocal's Opening Brief, p. 18. In addition, 
neither the Commission, nor the Division of Oil, Gas & Mining and the Utah Association of 
Counties which also filed amicus briefs, ever requested or discussed a prospective relief 
limitation in their briefs. 
6
 At the time the Petition for Rehearing was pending, an amendment to Rule 35 was 
also pending which would have prohibited an amicus party from filing a petition for 
rehearing. That amendment was adopted by April 1, 2004. Utah R. App. P., Rule 35(e). 
This pending amendment was referred to by the Commission in its Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Strike, but because the Court provided no grounds for its denial of the 
Petition for Rehearing, it is not clear whether the Petition was denied on its merits or for 
alleged procedural defects. 
8 
absence of a record on this issue resulted in an erroneous decision. Munson, 2007 UT 91, ^ f 20. 
C. The Failure Of Other Taxpayers To Challenge The Prospective Relief 
Limitation Is N o Grounds For Denying Relief To Unocal. 
The Commission warns that reversal of the prospective effect limitation "at this point 
in time would be unfair to those taxpayers who justifiably relied upon the Court's decision 
and would be barred by the statute of limitations from now filing claims." Commission's 
Brief, p. 43.7 The outcome of this issue should not depend on whether all severance 
taxpayers can be made whole. Statutes of limitations have always precluded potential 
litigants from obtaining relief to which they would otherwise be entided, but for the lapse of 
time. No court has ever denied a litigant relief to which it is legally entided simply because 
other similarly situated parties have neglected to assert their claims in a timely manner. The 
taxpayers which the Commission suggests will be treated unfairly if Unocal prevails, were 
already singled out for unfair treatment when this Court declined to give retroactive effect to 
its decision in ExxonMobil Unocal has expended considerable time and resources to 
challenge the Commission's erroneous application of severance tax provisions which were 
not at issue in ExxonMobil, and, at the same time, has pursued its claim that the prospective 
effect limitation was erroneously applied by this Court. The fact that other taxpayers may 
not have exercised their legal rights in a timely manner is no basis for denying Unocal's 
7
 The Commission's concern for fairness to the taxpayers is ironic inasmuch as the 
Commission has persisted in enforcing an interpretation of the severance tax provisions 
which is contrary to the correct interpretation as determined by the ExxonMobil Court. The 
Commission seems to believe that fair treatment is only essential when it would result in 
additional tax liability. 
9 
request that the Court overrule the prospective effect limitation and allow Unocal to rely on 
the correct interpretation of the severance tax laws. 
D. The Prospective Relief Limitation Is Improper Because ExxonMobil 
Presented A Matter Of Statutory Interpretation. 
As Unocal explained in its Opening Brief, the ExxonMobil Court erred when it gave 
prospective effect to its decision because the decision did not establish a new rule of law. 
McCloskey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal'Bd., 460 A.2d 237, 239 (Pa. 1983) ("[T|he test as 
to whether a decision is applied prospectively or retroactively is whether it articulates a new 
and unforeshadowed rule of law."). When a court answers "a specific question about the 
meaning of a statute, [its] initial interpretation does not announce a newr rule of law." Fiore v. 
White, 562 Pa. 634, 644,757 A.2d 842, 848 (2000). Accordingly, concerns for retroactivity are 
not implicated in matters of statutory interpretation. Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228 (U.S. 
2001).8 The Commission's brief is devoid of any response to Unocal's discussion on this 
point. 
The ExxonMobil Court unquestionably engaged in statutory interpretation. 
ExxonMobil, fflf 10, 14, 19, 20, and 22. The Court did not change the existing law, nor did it 
declare the statute unconstitutional. It simply applied well-established principles of statutory 
8
 The availability of retroactive relief in matters of statutory interpretation was 
decisively addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fiore v. White. The Court had certified a 
question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asking whether a prior decision {Scarpone) which 
the petitioner sought to have applied in his case was a new law or a clarification of existing 
law. The state supreme court explained that Scarpone "did not announce a new rule of law 
[but] merely clarified the plain language of the statute." Fiore, 562 Pa. at 646, 757 A.2d at 
848-849. The U.S. Supreme Court then held that there was "no issue of retroactivity" 
because the statute in question was "not new law," but "was the law of Pennsylvania — as 
properly interpreted - at the time of Fiore's conviction." 531 U.S. at 228. 
10 
interpretation to determine the correct interpretation of the statute. Id. at f 14. In Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 675 (Utah 1984), this Court held that "[t]he general rule from time 
immemorial is that the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature of the law both 
retrospectively and prospectively." Thus, when the ExxonMobil Court interpreted the 
severance tax provisions at issue therein, its interpretation was a determination of "the true 
nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Because the ExxonMobil decision 
was a matter of statutory interpretation, a fact which the Commission does not dispute, it 
was "not new law" and "presented] no issue of retroactivity." Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. at 228. 
If this Court allows the prospective relief limitation to remain in place, then an agency's 
persistent misinterpretation of a statute will be sufficient to establish a new rule of law even 
when that interpretation is not supported by the language of the statute. See discussion, 
Unocal's Opening Brief, pp. 25-32. 
III. THIS COURT'S DECISION N O T TO APPLY EXXONMOBIL TO 
"PENDING" MATTERS SHOULD BE I N T E R P R E T E D LITERALLY, 
Unocal does not believe that the prospective effect limitation was appropriate in this 
case. However, in the event this Court upholds the limitation, it should apply the limitation 
in accordance with the express language of the ExxonMobil Court This Court spoke plainly 
when it issued the prospective relief limitation in ExxonMobilstating, "as to other parties who 
may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax 
Commission, our holding is to apply prospectively only." ExxonMobil, J^ 24 (emphasis 
added). Despite this plain language, the Commission refused to abate the deficiency 
assessment for the Second Audit Period even though the assessment was not "pending" 
when the ExxonMobil decision was issued, but was issued nearly a year later. 
11 
The Commission argues that all prospective relief limitations, by definition, apply to 
time periods preceding the issuance of the decision containing the limitation, even if the 
claim results from an action taken by the Commission after the decision was issued. 
Alternatively, the Commission claims that Unocal's appeal of the deficiency assessment for 
the Second Audit Period was "pending" during ExxonMobil because it raises the same issues 
which were resolved by ExxonMobil, Neither theory excuses the Commission's decision to 
ignore the parameters established by the ExxonMobil Court. 
A, The Commission's Decision Ignores The ExxonMobil'Court's Exercise 
Of Its Recognized Right To Establish The Scope Of Its Prospective 
Effect Limitation. 
The Commission cited American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (U.S. 
1990), in support of its claim that a court's issuance of a prospective effect limitation 
automatically prohibits the retroactive application of the relevant decision to all matters 
arising prior to the issuance of the decision. Thus, the Commission suggests that the 
ExxonMobil Court's statement that the prospective relief limitation only applies to "refund 
requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission," 
does not prohibit it from assessing new taxes for periods prior to the issuance of that 
decision. ExxonMobil, f^ 24. 
The Commission's characterization of the American Trucking case ignores the U.S. 
Supreme Court's distinction between state and federal issues. The Court recognized that 
when a state court is interpreting state law, it has the authority to determine the scope of any 
limitation on retroactive application-'cWhen questions of state law are at issue, state courts 
generally have the authority to determine the retroactivity of their own decisions." The 
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ExxonMobil Court exercised that authority when it held that its ruling would not apply to 
"refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending be fore the Tax 
Commission." ExxonMobil, \ 24.9 
Resolution of this issue requires the Court to look no further than the plain language 
of the ExxonMobil decision. Just as the Court relied on the plain language of Rio Algom to 
determine the scope of the prospective relief limitation in Kennecott, this Court should likewise 
adhere to its own plain directive. 
B. This Court's Prospective Effect Limitation Applied To "Deficiency 
Proceedings"- Not Issues-Which Were Pending During ExxonMobil 
Because the Commission is well-aware that the deficiency assessment was not 
pending at the time the ExxonMobil decision was issued, the Commission suggests that the 
prospective effect limitation applies because the issues raised by the later appeal "were 
pending before the Tax Commission at the time ExxonMobil was decided." Commission 
Brief, p. 38-39. If the prospective effect limitation truly meant that the ExxonMobil decision 
would not be applied to all cases wherein the valuation issues are the same as the issues 
raised by ExxonMobil, then the ExxonMobil case would have no application whatsoever. The 
essence of a prospective effect limitation is that an issue is resolved one way prior to the 
issuance of the decision, and another way thereafter. The Commission's interpretation 
would essentially void the decision which is meant to be prospectively applied. 
9
 By suggesting that this Court has the authority to define the parameters of a 
prospective effect limitation, Unocal is not suggesting that the Court had the right to apply 
the prospective effect doctrine in the ExxonMobil case. 
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The Commission's claim that die deficiency assessment which was issued in 2004 was 
"pending" in 2003 because it involved issues raised in ExxonMobil, also ignores the plain 
language of the Court's requirement that what must be pending is the "refund requests, 
deficiency proceedings, or similar matters." ExxonMobil, \ 24. The Court was "cogni2ant of 
the various available options" for crafting a prospective relief limitation, Kennecott Corp, v. 
Utah State Tax Comm\ 862 P.2d 1348, 1350-1351 (Utah 1993), and specifically limited the 
scope of that limitation to only those matters which were "pending before the Tax 
Commission." ExxonMobil, \ 24. If the Court declines to overrule the prospective relief 
limitation, it should, at the very least, apply that limitation in accordance with the plain 
limiting language of the ExxonMobil Court 
C. The Enforcement Of Post-ExxonMobil Deficiency Assessments Which 
Violate The Correct Interpretation Of the Statute Violates Due Process. 
This Court applied well-established principles of statutory interpretation when it 
determined that valuation for severance tax purposes "must occur in the immediate vicinity 
of the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, j^ 24. 
The deficiency assessment issued nearly one year after this interpretation of the statute was 
provided, assesses severance taxes based on the value of the oil and gas at the point of 
eventual sale-precisely the valuation method rejected by this Court. Id. The Commission 
has upheld that deficiency assessment, requiring Unocal to pay nearly $1 million in severance 
taxes based on a statutory interpretation rejected by this Court. The Commission's 
acquiescence in this practice essentially leaves the taxpayer without any means to redress 
wrongfully assessed taxes. Clearly the assessment does not comport with statutory language. 
See ExxonMobil Yet, the taxpayer is left without the ability to challenge the assessment in any 
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meaningful way because the Commission refused to apply the ExxonMobil decision to 
matters which were not "pending before the Tax Commission"at the time the ExxonMobil 
decision was rendered. Id. at f^ 24. 
IV. T H E COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 
WHICH HAD N O T B E E N AT ISSUE I N EXXONMOBIL. 
There are four statutory provisions which Unocal claims were disregarded by the 
Commission when it sustained the deficiency assessments. First, the Commission erred 
when it upheld the deficiency assessments even though they were not based on the value of 
the oil and gas as it was "transported from the field," as required by Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-
102(l)(a). Second, the Commission erred when it refused to find error in the Division's use 
of sweet oil postings to value sour oil in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103(l)(b). 
Third, the Commission erred when it upheld the Division's refusal to allow statutorily 
available deductions for transportation and processing costs. Id. § 59-5-101(7), (11), and (17). 
Finally, the Commission erred in upholding the Division's interpretation of the annual 
exemption. Id. § 59-5-102(2)(a). 
The Commission defends its statutory interpretations by claiming that the statutes 
require valuation of oil and gas after processing has been completed. The ExxonMobil Court 
has already rejected that argument and the Commission's duplication of its arguments to the 
ExxonMobil Count are simply not relevant to the issues of statutory interpretation raised by 
this appeal. The prospective effect limitation does not protect the Commission from 
challenges to statutory provisions which were not the subject of the ExxonMobillitigation. 
Therefore, the prc-ExxonMobil practices which may have existed with regard to the statutes 
Unocal claims have been violated, are simply not relevant. 
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A. The Commission Ignored The Statutory Requirement That Oil And Gas 
Be Valued When It Is "Transported Off The Field/' 
Until the Formal Hearing took place, the Division was not aware that the Lisbon 
Plant was not located on the Lisbon Unit. The Commission made the factual finding that 
the Plant was off the field, but sustained the deficiency assessments because "it [had] not 
been shown that this fact would have affected the assessments under the Division's pre-
ExxonMobilpractices." R. 53. As Unocal explained in its brief, the Division's pre-
ExxonMobil practices could provide no defense once Unocal established that the statutory 
requirement that the oil or gas be valued when it was "transported off the field" had been 
disregarded. There is simply no precedent for the Commission's determination that a plain 
statutory provision may be ignored if the taxing entity demonstrates an established practice 
of disregarding that provision. 
The Commission defends its refusal to find error in the assessments stating that it 
"did not deem it significant that the gas plant was less than 1/4 mile off the lease." 
Commission's Brief, p. 22. The statutory requirement that oil or gas be valued when it is 
"transported from the field" does not depend on whether the product is transported 1/4 
mile or 400 miles from the field boundaries. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a). Even the 
Division's own witness had acknowledged that '"the proper point of valuation would be 
before [the oil and gas] went into the plant.'" R. 40. According to the plain statutory 
language, the taxable event occurred at the moment the product left the boundaries of the 
field. 
The Commission also claims that calculation of value at the point the product left the 
field would have resulted in a higher tax. The allegation that the tax would have been higher 
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is likewise no defense of the Commission's disregard of plain statutory language.10 If correct 
application of the statute would have resulted in a higher tax, the Commission should have 
applied the statute according to its plain language. However, it is strains reason to suggest 
that Unocal's severance tax liability would be increased as a result of the taxing the oil and 
gas when it was "transported from the field" inasmuch as the Division and, now, the 
Commission have vigorously opposed the application of the statute. 
The resolution of the legal issue of whether the Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a) 
requires valuation of the oil or gas at the point when the product is "transported from the 
field," does not require this Court to make any factual determinations. The Commission's 
claim that application of the statute would result in a higher tax is immaterial. The 
Commission's claim that Unocal's initial calculations in its refund request were based on 
plant volumes is likewise immaterial. This Court should simply resolve the legal issue and 
then vacate the deficiency assessment because it does not comply with the statutory 
requirement that the oil and gas be valued when it is "transported from the field." 
10
 The Commission's claim that the taxes would be higher should the oil and gas be 
valued as it left the field should not be taken into account by the Court as it determines the 
correct interpretation of the statute. First, the Commission did not make any factual findings 
at the conclusion of the Formal Hearing regarding whether the oil or gas would have a higher 
value if it were valued when it was "transported from the field." Second, the method 
referred to by the Commission in its Brief (which was proposed by the Division in a hearing 
exhibit) is not one of the statutory valuation methods and, therefore, could not be used to 
determine value. Finally, the Commission's claim that the correct application of the statute 
would result in a higher tax is not supported by the testimony of the Division's witness. In 
the section of the transcript referred to by the Commission in support of its disregard of the 
statute, Ms. Goss testified that the calculation of the value of oil and gas when it left the field 
could not be made without taking into account the costs associated with the plant, stating 
that "it depends on, really on the costs of the plant." R. 2, p. 340 lines 9-10. 
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B. The Commission Erred When It Upheld The Division's Use Of Sweet 
Oil Postings To Value Sour Oil In The Second Deficiency Assessment. 
This point of error is only relevant to the second deficiency assessment. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-5-103(l)(b) allows valuation to occur based on "consideration of information 
relevant in valuing like-quality oil or gas at the wellin the same field or nearby fields or 
areas such as: posted prices, prices received in arm's-length spot sales, or other reliable public 
sources of price or market information . . . ." 
Unocal believes that, if this Court does not reconsider the prospective relief 
limitation, then, at the very least, that limitation does not apply to the second deficiency 
assessment because it was not "pending" at the time the ExxonMobil decision was issued. 
Therefore, the valuation of the oil produced during the second audit period must comply 
with the ExxonMobil requirement that valuation "occur in the immediate vicinity of the well, 
with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, jf 24. Alternatively, 
the oil must be valued in its natural sour state because it was "transported from the field" in 
that condition. See discussion at III, A, supra. 
The Commission affirmed the Division's use of the posted price method because the 
Giant's Paradox Basin oil was "in a similar 'sweet' state as Unocal's oil at the point of 
eventual sale, i.e., the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant." R. 41 (emphasis added). Because the 
ExxonMobil Court has already rejected the Commission's claim that "severance taxes should 
be based on the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale" id. (emphasis added), 
the Commission is wrong to suggest that available price information, contract or otherwise, 
for "completed production which transfer tide or possession at the approved measurement 
point for the field" is determinative of value for the second audit period, li ExxonMobil dots 
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not apply, the Commission is still wrong because the oil should have been valued in the 
condition it was in when it was "transported from the field." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-
102(l)(a). 
The Commission defends its decision to uphold the assessment by suggesting that 
Unocal bore the burden of "show[ing] that there are no arm's length contracts, then no non-
arm Vlength contracts which would be comparable to arm's length contracts for purchases 
of like-quality gas or oil in the same field." Commission's Brief, p. 24. Unocal met its 
burden when it persuaded the Commission that "the sour oil produced from the 
Mississippian Pool was not of like quality to [that] sweet oil." R. 27 at f^ 90. The only pricing 
information which would be relevant for purposes of establishing value of the oil produced 
from the Mississippian Pool is pricing information for sour oil. Because the Commission 
upheld the Division's use of posted prices for sweet oil, it did not make any findings with 
regard to other possible comparable posted prices. The Commission's suggestion, at this 
stage of the litigation, that other posted prices could have been used to value the sour oil, or 
that adjustments could be made to reflect the lesser quality of the oil are not relevant to this 
Court's determination of whether the Commission properly interpreted the statutory 
valuation methodology requiring "consideration of information relevant in valuing like-
quality oil or gas at the well." 
C. The Commission Erred When It Held That Federal Regulations 
Superseded Statutory Provisions. 
As Unocal explained in its Opening Brief, the Commission erred when it held that it 
was not required to "employ the guidance found in the Section 59-5-101 net-back 
definitions" unless "the federal regulations are silent as to an issue." R. 45. This represents a 
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gross departure from established law which is that "an agency's rules must be consistent with 
its governing statutes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Division, Utah State Tax Comrn'n, 846 P.2d 
1304 (Utah 1993). 
Unocal does not dispute that section 4 of House Bill 63 was still in effect during the 
First and Second Audit Periods. However, as Unocal explained in its brief, the rules 
incorporated by that section have no more force than administrative rules which could have 
been adopted by the Commission during that time and would still have been subordinate to 
any applicable statute. Insofar as the federal regulations conflict with plain statutory 
language, those rules are not enforceable. Id. 
Unocal explained that the statute permits the deduction of "reasonable actual costs of 
transporting oil or gas products from the well to the point of sale" whereas the federal 
regulation does not permit the deduction of gathering costs, which are defined as the 
movement of product to a point off the lease. Unocal's Brief, pp. 43-44. Unocal also 
explained that the statutory definition of "processing costs" does not restrict the amount of 
processing costs which may be deducted to calculate the value of NGLs. Utah Code Ann. 
§59-5-101(l l) .n 
11
 The only reason the processing allowance was not increased for 1994 and 1995 was 
that Unocal had not obtained MMS approval for those years as required by the federal 
regulations. Inasmuch as the requirement for MMS approval is not statutory, but is imposed 
by federal regulations, its exceeds the scope of the statute and is not enforceable." Morgan 
County, 2001 UT 57 J^ 7 ("rules are subordinate to statutes and cannot confer greater rights or 
disabilities"). Despite its approval of a 99% processing allowance for 1996 through 1999, the 
Commission now suggests that Unocal deducted improper costs to derive its processing 
allowance. Commission's Brief, pp. 30-31. No such finding was made by the Commission in 
the Final Decision and the Commission's approval of the deductions for 1996 through 1999 
should foreclose it from now challenging the same deductions for the 1994 and 1995 
assessment years. 
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The Commission has not refuted the fact that there is a material difference between 
the statutory definitions of "transportation costs" and "processing costs" and the federal 
regulations upon which the Commission relied. The Commission's conclusion that it was 
"bound by the federal regulations" despite its undisputed conflict with a plain statutory 
provision violates this Court's long-standing recognition that "rules are subordinate to 
statutes and cannot confer greater rights or disabilities." Morgan County v. Holnam, Inc. and 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 57 J^ 7, 29 P.3d 629, quoting SF Phosphates Co. v. Auditing Div., 
972 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1988) {quoting Rocky Mountain Energy v. State Tax Comm\ 852 P.2d 
284, 287 (Utah 1993)). 
The Commission also claims that Unocal is robbing the citizens of this state by 
deducting processing and transportation costs to determine the value of its oil and gas. This 
allegation ignores the findings of the ExxonMobil Court. The Court unequivocally rejected 
the Commission's position, resurrected in this case, that "severance taxes should be based on 
the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale." Id. The Court held that the severance 
tax must be based on the value of the oil and gas "in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, 
^| 24. The fact that Unocal has incurred significant costs to make the oil and gas marketable 
does not entitle the citizens of this state to impose a tax on the expenses associated with 
Unocal's efforts. Those efforts do not represent a taxable resource of the State. Likewise, 
the Commission's protestations notwithstanding, the value of oil and gas in 2008 is irrelevant 
to the value of oil and gas in 1994 through 1999.12 
12
 Although it is tempting to reply to the Commission's allegation that severance tax 
"shortchanges future generations" if it does not reflect the fact that "resources which are 
taken from the state become more valuable over time," the absurdity of that position is self-
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D. The Commission Erred In Its Interpretation Of The Annual Well 
Exemption. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5~102(5)(a) creates an annual exemption for the first 
$50,000 in gross value of production from "each well or wells." This Court, in matters of 
statutory interpretation, has consistently recognized that '"each term in the statute was used 
advisedly," and has required that "the statutory words are read literally, unless such a 
reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable!" Atlas Steel v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
2002 UT 112, PI 9 (Utah 2002), quoting County Bd. of Equalisation of Wasatch County v. State Tax 
Common, 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) {quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 811 
P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)) (emphasis added). 
The Commission's claim that the "well exemption" is a "field exemption," ignores the 
literal meaning of the words of the statute and results in an "unreasonably confused or 
inoperable" exemption. Id. In its Final Decision, the Commission relied on the definition of 
"well or wells" as "any extractive means" to conclude that "the operation of a number of 
wells to extract oil and gas would appear to be a single means of extraction." R. 50.13 This 
conclusion ignores the ExxonMobilCourt's interpretation of the statutory definition of "well 
or wells" and strains the literal meaning of the terms of the statutes. 
In ExxonMobil, this Court rejected the Commission's claim that "value at the well" did 
not refer to each individual well. In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the 
evident and does not merit a response. See Commission's Brief, p. 32. 
13
 The statute defines "well or wells" as "any extractive means from which oil or gas 
is produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one person." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20). 
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statutory definition of "well or wells" and determined that "a well is an 'extractive means.'" 
ExxonMobil, J^ 16. This conclusion cannot be reconciled with the Commission's conclusion 
that "there is no evidence to suggest that each well should be considered a separate extractive 
means." R. 50. 
The Commission's characterization of the exemption as a "field exemption" ignores 
the plain language of the exemption. Had the Legislature intended to provide a single 
exemption for each field, it would have used the term "field," rather than "well or wells." In 
addition, the statutory definition of "well or wells" recognizes that while wells may be located 
within a field-they are not one in the same. The Commission's claim that the well 
exemption is a field exemption requires this Court to ignore plain statutory language. 
The Commission's claim that the "well exemption" is a "field exemption," also results 
in an "unreasonably confused or inoperable" exemption. Id. Because wells in a single field 
are not typically owned by the same entities, the exemption applicable to each well, under the 
Commission's interpretation, will be entirely dependant on how many wells each particularly 
entity owns within the field.14 For example, if three entities collectively own 30 wells in a 
single field, then, under the Commission's interpretation, they share a single $50,000 
exemption. ($50,000 + 30 = $1666).15 Each well would receive an exemption for the first 
14
 The Division's witness acknowledged that "[a] lot of plants have other production 
going into the plant. So they have to measure your production versus someone else's 
production so that the plant will know how to prorate the production that goes out of the 
plant." R. 2 (Goss test. Day 2, p. 336 1. 15-17). 
15
 Despite the Commission's claim to the contrary, the requirement that the 
exemption be prorated does not support its claim that the exemption applies to a group of 
wells. Rather it is an implicit recognition of the fact that most wells have more than one 
owner. 
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$1666 of product, to be prorated amongst the three owners. If the well owners divide up the 
wells equally, each having separate title to 10 wells, then each owner will receive a $50,000 
exemption so that the amount applicable to each well would be $5000 ($50,000 -=- 10), nearly 
three times the exemption resulting from shared ownership of all wells on the field. Also, 
under the Commission's interpretation, if a separate entity owns a single well in the same 
field, that owner is entitled to a full $50,000 exemption on his single well even though the 
well is in the same field as the other 30 wells. The interpretation advocated by the 
Commission results in an inconsistent exemption-$50,000 for some well owners and a 
fraction of that for other well owners. The only way this exemption can be fairly and 
uniformly applied is to give effect to the statute's plain language and recognize an exemption 
for "each well or wells." 
Finally, Unocal's interpretation is consistent with the legislature's use of the word 
"wells" in other statutory exemptions which apply to single wells. As Unocal pointed out in 
its Opening Brief, there are several other severance tax exemptions wherein the term "wells" 
is used and the exemption is applied to all qualifying wells within a field. The Commission 
has not rebutted this crucial fact. See e.g § 59-5-102(2)(b) (production from "stripper welW 
exempt even when stripper wells coexist with other producing wells in same field); § 59-5-
102(2)(d) (exemption for "first six months of production for wells started after 
January 1, 1984, but before January 1, 1990"). 
The historical practice of the Division, in treating this exemption as a "field 
exemption," is simply not determinative. Either the exemption is applicable to "each well or 
wells" or it is not. Clearly, the characterization of the exemption as a "field exemption" 
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requires a fundamental alteration in the language of the exemption. Moreover, it ignores the 
fact that not all wells in a field are owned by the same entity or entities.16 The only way to 
give consistent meaning to the well exemption is to apply it in the manner suggested by 
Unocal.17 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments set forth in both its Opening and Reply Briefs, Unocal 
respectfully asks the Court for the rulings and relief requested in its Opening Brief. 
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2008. 
W O O D CRAPO LLC 
David J. Crapo 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
16
 The Commission also claims that its interpretation of the rule is "consistent with 
the concept of one 'entity'. . . ." and by the fact that "[t]he Veil or well's producing in a unit 
are given a single entity number." Commission's Brief, p. 34. However, the definition of 
"entity" is irrelevant to the well exemption because the exemption does not apply to an 
"entity," but to "the first $50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells . . . ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-5-102(2). Furthermore, the entity number is the number which identifies the 
well owner(s). Each well has its own API Well Number in addition to a "Well Name." The 




 The Commission has not responded to Unocal's claim that the exemption should 
not have been prorated for 1999 because, by its express terms, it applies to "the first 
$50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells " Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(2). 
Accordingly, Unocal provides no additional argument on this issue and requests the Court 
interpret this provision as requested in its Opening Brief. 
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ERRORS IN T H E COMMISSION'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Unocal believes the Commission made several misstatements in its Brief that should 
be corrected for purposes of the record in this appeal. Unocal hereby identifies the 
misstatements and provides clarifying explanations with appropriate supporting citations to 
the record: 
Commission's Statement of Fact f^ 18: "Thirty percent of the gas plant is related to 
production of helium and sulfur. R.E. 53." 
Unocal's Response: While Unocal does not believe this is a material fact to the issues 
to be resolved by this Court, the Commission never made any findings regarding what 
percentage of the gas plant costs were related to production of helium and sulfur. The 
Commission's reference to "R.E." to support this alleged fact is to what the Commission has 
labeled "Respondent's Exhibit Binder." The "Respondent" at the Formal Hearing was the 
Auditing Division. That party should not be confused with the "Respondent" Commission 
in this proceeding. In other words, the exhibit referred to does not represent the findings of 
the Commission, the Respondent in this Petition. Accordingly, it is not appropriate for the 
Commission to present the Division's allegation as a "Statement of Fact" inasmuch as it was 
not a finding of the Commission in its Final Decision.1 
1
 While the Commission did not make a finding as to the percentage of the plant that 
was used to produce helium and sulfur, it did recognize that the removal of several 
contaminants was necessary for making the oil and gas marketable. R. 19, f^ 47 - R. 20, f^ 53. 
It found that "sulfur is removed and processed so that it can be sold." R. 20, ^ 53. It also 
referenced Mr. Wimberly's testimony that "the costs of treating the sulfur far exceed any 
revenue generated by the sales of the sulfur byproduct" Id. The Commission also found 
that "Helium is removed from the gas stream at the helium plant for further processing and 
sale." Id H56. 
Commission's Statement of Fact |^ 20: "Separation of the oil, water, sulfur, natural 
gas, NGLs and helium occurs at the Lisbon Plant R.E.'s 5, 25." 
Unocal's Response: The Commission found that the oil, gas, and water was initially 
separated at the wellhead. R. 15, f^ 26. It was then recombined and transported to the 
Lisbon Plant After arrival at the Plant, the oil, water, and gas was separated and the 
contaminants removed. R. 18-19, j^ 45. 
Commission's Statement of Fact [^ 22: "Following separation, the oil goes to storage 
tanks which are located near the Lisbon Plant From the tanks, oil is sold or transported 
from the Geld at the approved unit measurement point via pipeline, pursuant to arm's length 
contracts. R.E.'s 1, 5, 25." (Emphasis added). 
Unocal's Response: The Commission found that the oil was "transported from the 
field" before it ever reached the Lisbon Plant R. 18, f^ 42 ("When the oil or gas arrives at the 
Lisbon Plant, it is no longer on the property designated as the Lisbon Unit or Lisbon 
participating area."). This finding of fact was not appealed by the Division. It is 
inappropriate for the Commission to make a factual allegation which is contrary to its own 
findings. The exhibits referred to as support for the Commission's factual misstatement are 
exhibits which were prepared by the Respondent/Division in advance of the Formal 
Hearing. Prior to the hearing, the Division was under the erroneous impression that the 
Lisbon Plant was located within the parameters of the Lisbon Field. R. 30-31. Therefore, 
any representation contained in exhibits prepared prior to the hearing were based on that 
erroneous assumption. 
Commission's Statement of Fact |^ 26: ". . . The gas is sold or transported from the 
fields a meter which is at the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant, pursuant to arm's length 
contracts. (R.E. 1, 25.)." (Emphasis added). 
Unocal's Response: See discussion re. Commission's Statement of Fact j^ 22, supra. 
Commission's Statement of Fact % 27: "The NGLS are sold or transported from 
the field via pipeline at the tailgate of the Lisbon Gas Plant, pursuant to arm's length 
contracts. R.E. 1, 25." (Emphasis added). 
Unocal's Response: See discussion re. Commission's Statement of Fact f^ 22, supra. 
Commission's Statement of Fact |^ 38: "Unocal paid a quarterly installment for the 
period January 1, 1998 to March 31, 1998. No severance tax return was filed for 1998. 
R.E. 23." 
Unocal's Response: During 1998, Unocal filed quarterly returns, but neglected to file 
the annual return. The Division assessed a penalty for failure to file the annual return which 
was abated by the Commission because it "allows a waiver if a taxpayer has an excellent 
record of compliance." R. 52. The Commission found that " Unocal has such a record." Id. 
The Division did not cross-appeal the Commission's abatement of the penalty. By stating 
that Unocal did not file a return for 1998, the Commission creates the impression that 
Unocal was wilfully failing to comply with tax laws, despite the Commission's own 
determination that Unocal had "an excellent record of compliance." Id. 
Commission's Statement of Fact ^ 42: "On July 8, 2004, the Auditing Division issued 
a Statutory Notice of deficiency for the conservation fee for the period January 1, 1998 
through December 31, 1999. Unocal did not timely appeal this notice. P.E. 14, R. 989." 
Unocal's Response: In the appeal before the Commission, the Division had claimed 
that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over the 1998 and 1999 appeals because of 
Unocal's failure to appeal the original statutory notices. However, the Commission found 
that those notices were sent to the wrong party and would not infer a responsibility for 
Unocal to appeal from notices it had not received. Inasmuch as the Commission concluded 
that Unocal had no responsibility to file timely appeals of those notices, it is puzzling that the 
Commission, in its brief, repeatedly accuses Unocal of failing to file timely appeals of the 
1998 and 1999 Notices of Appeal. See Commission's Brief, p. 2 ("Unocal never appealed 
those notices."); p. 4 ("The Commission found that it had jurisdiction over Appeals 04-1283 
and 04-1284 for the tax years 1998 and 1999 despite the fact that no Petition was filed within 
30 days of the original Statutory Notice."); pp. 12-13 ("On July 8, 2004, the Auditing 
Division issued a Statutory Notice of deficiency for the conservation fee for the period 
January 1, 1998 through December 31, 1999. Unocal did not timely appeal this notice."); 
p. 13 ("On July 8, 2004, the Auditing Division issued a Statutory Notice of deficiency for the 
severance tax period January 1, 1998 through December 31, 1999. Unocal did not timely 
appeal this notice."); p. 38 ("[The Division] resent the statutory notice after Unocal failed to 
appeal"). These statements misrepresent the findings and conclusions of the Commission 
and should be disregarded by this Court 
Commission's Statement of Fact % 44: "On July 8, 2004, the Audiiting Division issued 
a Statutory Notice of deficiency for the severance tax period January 1, 1998 through 
December 31, 1999. Unocal did not timely appeal this notice. R. 990 
Unocal's Response: See discussion re. Commission's Statement of Fact [^ 42, supra. 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. JNDER UTAH LAW THE VALUE OF OIL FOR SEVERANCE TAX 
PURPOSES IS DETERMINED AT THE POINT PRODUCTION IS 
COMPLETED - WHEN THE PRODUCT IS IN A MARKETABLE 
CONDITION. 
A. The plain language of the Utah Code requires 
ExxonMobil's gas and oil production to be 
valued at the point production is complete. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103 (2000) outlines the procedure 
tor valuing oil and gas for purposes of taxation. It 
states: 
For purposes of computing the severance tax, the 
value of oil or gas at the well is the value 
established under an arm's-length contract. . . 
This is the primary method of valuation. The 
legislature has determined how the 'Value at the well" is to 
be determined. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(19) (2000) states, 
u
'value at the well' means the value of oil or gas at the 
point production is completed." The statutory definition 
therefore relies not on a physical location, but the 
completion of the process of production. 
When interpreting a statute one of the fundamental 
rules of construction is that the statute should be looked 
at in its entirety in accordance with the purpose which was 
sought to be accomplished. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
10 
C. Production is not complete until the product 
is in a marketable condition. 
The plain language of sections 59-5-103(1) (2000) and 
59-5-101(19) (2000) require oil and gas valuation to occur 
at the point production is complete. Production of oil is 
not complete until the oil has been separated from the 
water, gas and sediment which is necessary to place the 
product in a marketable condition. 
'"Production" is defined as uan act or process of 
producing, the creation of value or wealth by producing 
goods and services." Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary, 
page 939 (1984) . In relation to oil and gas, production is 
defined as: "The phase of the petroleum industry that deals 
with bringing the well fluids to the surface and separating 
them and storing, gauging, and otherwise preparing the 
product for the pipeline." A Dictionary of Petroleum Terms, 
page 120 (3rd Ed., 1983). (See Addendum.) "Complete" is 
defined as "having all necessary or normal parts, elements, 
or steps, completed is to make complete, to bring to an end, 
conclude." Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary, supra, at 
290. When the legislature defined value at the well as "the 
point production is completed," it contemplated how oil and 
gas is actually produced and sold in the marketplace. 
18 
Unless specifically stated, words or phrases used in a 
statute are to be given their normal ordinary meaning. 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). 
Any ordinary understanding of the completion of the 
production process is when the product is finished and ready 
for market. If a plant produces a product, production would 
not be complete until the product is assembled, tested, 
packaged and ready to ship. A contract for the purchase of 
the product at that point is a contract for "completed 
production." 
D. The Terms should be construed to promote 
uniformity. 
The legislatures of neighboring Wyoming and Nevada have 
concurred in the view that the production process is not 
complete until the product is in a marketable condition. 
Wyoming Statutes § 39-14-203(b)(ii) (Supp. 1999); Nevada 
Revised Statutes § 522.115(3). (Addendum C.) It is 
significant that those states bordering Utah - Nevada and 
Wyoming have statutorily3 adopted this definition-
Production from fields which may be separated only by a 
geographical border should not change in character. The -
3
 Colorado has also adopted this position in Rogers v. 
Westerman Farm Company, 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001). Discussed 
at Section E herein. 
19 
E. Other courts have interpreted the term "value 
at the well" to include a requirement that the 
product be placed in a marketable condition. 
In Rogers v. Westerman Farm Company, 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 
2001), the Colorado Supreme Court did an extensive review of 
the literature and case law surrounding the interpretation 
of "value at the well" language in oil and gas royalty 
agreements. It specifically rejected the reasoning of those 
jurisdictions that have found that gas was ''produced" at the 
point it was physically severed. The Colorado Court 
concluded: 
The point where a marketable product is first 
obtained is the logical point where the 
exploration and production segment of the oil and 
gas industry ends, it is the point where the 
primary objective of the lease contract is 
achieved, and therefore is the logical point for 
the calculation of royalty. 
Id. at 904. 
This case contains a lengthy and well-reasoned -
discussion of prior case law on this issue. The Supreme 
Courts of Oklahoma and Kansas, two significant oil producing 
states, have also adopted the position that the producer's 
responsibility is not complete until the product is in a 
marketable condition. See Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe 
Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 1998); Sternberqer v. 
23 
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Marathon Oil Company. 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995). 
F. Scholarly definitions of when production is 
complete support the Division's position. 
Professor Eugene Kuntz in his Treatise on Law of Oil 
and Gas. Volume 3, Section 40.5(b) (1989) states, "The acts 
which constitute production have not ceased until a 
marketable product has been obtained." This view is echoed 
by Professor Owen L. Andersen, Professor .of Oil, Gas and 
Natural Resource Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
He states in discussing the term XNat the well": 
The point at which gas first becomes a marketable 
product would be established on the basis of a 
known and real market. There would be no need to 
deduct costs other than transportation because the 
value of the gas as a first marketable product 
would otherwise be known. In other words, unlike 
the Piney Woods view, production would end at the 
point where a first marketable product has in fact 
been obtained, which is not necessarily at the 
point of extraction. 
Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuations; Should Royalty 
Obligations be Determined Intrinsically, Theoretically, or 
Realistically? 37 Nat. Resource J. 611, 641-642 (1997). 
Likewise J.G. Martin, in Summary of Significant Gas and 
Transportation Changes Affecting Producers in the 1990 !s, 37 
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. § 16-01 (1991), states that the 
production function of the gas industry includes the 
2 4 
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producer being responsible for putting the gas in a 
marketable state by removing its impuriLies and gathering 
the gas from the various points of production (wellhead) an 
delivering it via gathering lines to a common point for 
delivery on to the large diameter transmission lines. 
II. OIL PRODUCTION IS WHAT IS MEASURED AND VALUED. 
ExxonMobil reports its production to the Utah Division 
of Oil, Gas and Mining. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5(2) (g) 
(1998). ExxonMobil measures its production at the same 
points at which the Auditing Division has calculated value, 
that is, at the lease automated custody transfer. (R. 754-
755.) The Division of Oil, Gas and Mining tracks the 
disposition, that is, the sale or use of the commodities 
produced. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5(2)(i). In performing 
audits, the Auditing Division compares the volumes of oil 
for which severance tax has been reported to the production 
figures reported to the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. 
(R. 798-799. ) 
ExxonMobil does not constantly measure production at 
the mouth of each well. (R. 754.) Rather, the wells flow 
into a gathering system. The gathering system contains a 
manifold device that allows for the testing of wells on an 
2 5 
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The bulk of the brief in opposition filed by amici attempts 
to argue the merits of the petition for rehearing. Those points 
are not addressed here. The Motion to Strike deals only with the 
propriety of filing of the petition. In dealing with this issue 
amici acknowledge that the ordinary or general rule forbids the 
filing of Petition for Rehearing by amici. 3B C.J.S. Amicus 
Curiae § 17, 4 Am.Jur. 2nd Amicus Curiae § 10. However, amici 
would have Court draw the inference that since this is a general 
rule there must be exceptions. They cite none. Neither the 
treatises cited nor the state's research indicate any exceptions 
to this rule. 
An amicus is not a party to the action and cannot assume the 
functions of a party. Montana Wildlife Federation v. Sager, 620 
P.2d 1189 (1980); Nail v. Baca, 626 P.2d 1280 (NLM. 1980); Matter 
of Does Adoption, 555 P.2d 906 (Ok. Et. App. 1976). "It is horn 
book law that an amicus curiae cannot take exceptions to the 
rulings of the court; cannot take the case from one court another 
by appeal or writ of error; cannot apply for a rehearing." City 
and County of Denver v. Denver Tramway Corporation, 23 F.2d 287 
(8th Cir. 1927). 
The antiquity of the cases stating this principle, and the 
lack of case law during the intervening period challenging it, 
support the common sense notion that an amicus, as a non-party, 
cannot assume the functions of a party, nor may it assume 
management or control over the action. Kansas City v. Kindle, 
446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969). This includes filing for rehearing. 
The proposed amendment to Rule 35 simply codifies what has 
been the common law in this state since 1929, and what has been 
the generally accepted rule as indicated by the cases and 
authorities cited. That is, that an amicus curiae cannot file a 
2 
petition for rehearing. 
The State of Utah, and the Utah State Tax Commission, 
therefore respectfully request that the Petition for Rehearing 
filed by amici in the above captioned matter be stricken. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this jS1 ^  day of December, 2003. 
rrx 
"eCftRK'L. SNELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Amicus are not a nparty to this action." They have no 
standing to petition the court for rehearing. In Barnes v. Lehi 
City, 279 P. 878, 837(Utah 1929), this Court addressed the 
question and found that "council as friends of the court, having 
no control or management of the case, are not entitled to 
petition for a rehearing or to be further heard." 
The consent of the parties to participate initially in 
filing an amicus curiae brief does not extend to the amicus the 
full rights of a party to the litigation. Having participated by 
0016 
filing their brief and appearing at oral argument, amici have 
fully filled their function. Appellees, Utah State Tax 
Commission and the State of Utah, object to this attempt by 
council for amici to seek rehearing. The Petition lies outside 
the rules and should not be reviewed by the Court. 
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the State of Utah and the Utah State Tax Commission 
hereby move for an Order striking amici attempt to file a 
petition for rehearing in the above-captioned matter. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this jO*^ day of December, 2003. 
NrGARK L. S'NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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